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Abstract
This paper estimates the e¤ect of piracy attacks on shipping costs
using a unique data set on shipping contracts in the dry bulk market.
We look at shipping routes whose shortest path exposes them to piracy
attacks and nd that the increase in attacks in 2008 lead to around a
ten percent increase in shipping costs. We use this estimate to get a
sense of the welfare loss imposed by piracy. Our intermediate estimate
suggests that the creation of $120 million of revenue for pirates in the
Somalia area led to a welfare loss of over $1:5 billion.
We thank seminar participants at the LSE(EOPP), DIW and IAE. We thank Richard
Neylon for useful advice. Ali Saadatnia and Alessandro Torti provided valuable research
assistance. We thank the International Growth Centre (IGC) at LSE for nancial assis-
tance in collecting the data. Fetzer thanks the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for support.
Mueller thanks MOVE. All mistakes are ours.
1
1 Introduction
For centuries, piracy has posed a threat to ocean-going trade.1 In essence,
it is organized private predation which thrives in locations in which law and
order is weak, either because particular states provide safe havens or due
to poor international cooperation. And it has repercussions for worldwide
trade.
However, despite the long-standing importance of piracy, little is known
about its economic costs.2 The issue has been brought into sharp relief by
the upsurge of piracy in the Gulf of Aden which poses a threat to one of
the worlds busiest shipping routes. Frequently attributed to the collapse
of e¤ective authority in Somalia, it has provoked an international response.
However, the threat to shipping remains.
This paper does three things. First, we model the frequency of piracy
attacks in two main piracy areas where it is prevalent (Indonesia and So-
malia) as a means of generating monthly forecasts of such attacks. Second,
we match the piracy forecast to data on around 24,000 shipping contracts
by constructing the closest navigable sea distance between each origin and
destination port for which a ship has been chartered. This allows us to ex-
ploit the monthly time-series variation in the frequency of piracy attacks in
our two piracy areas and to estimate how much an upsurge in piracy raises
shipping costs. Third, we use these estimates to examine the welfare cost of
Somali piracy.
Our core model of piracy attacks posits that an unobserved latent state
(law and order) and weather conditions determine the level of piracy attacks.
Estimating the parameters of a Markov chain model gives us a measure of
underlying persistence in states which is useful for generating piracy forecasts.
We show that month-to-month variation in weather conditions also explains
the frequency of attacks.
We estimate that shipping costs for dry bulk goods rose by around 10%
when pirate activity increased in Somalia. This is partly identied from how
such costs react to changes in pirate activity induced by seasonal changes
1For example, North (1968) argues that a decline in piracy from 1600 to 1850 accounts
for a signicant proportion of the observed productivity increases in transatlantic shipping
in this period.
2Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzoso (2011) study the impact of piracy in the Strait of
Malacca on trade costs. Most cited numbers are from One Earth Future Foundation
(2010, 2011).
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in weather. Our estimates suggest that it is around 14% cheaper to charter
ships through the Gulf of Aden during the summer monsoon (June-August)
than in spring (March-May). And this seasonal pattern in shipping prices
is absent prior to the upsurge in pirate activity in the region during 2008.
There is little robust evidence of e¤ects of piracy attacks on shipping that
passes through the Indonesia region where piracy attacks are less prevalent
and less episodic.
The extra shipping costs that we uncover are mostly due to the increased
security measures that are needed to repel pirate attacks and hence con-
stitute a welfare cost as labor and resources are allocated from productive
tasks to guard services. We develop a model to compare this extraction of
resources through pirate attacks to a tax on shipping which nances an equiv-
alent transfer. This allows us to calculate the welfare loss caused by piracy.
Our central estimate suggests that the resource costs incurred in transferring
around 120 million USD annually to Somali pirates is well in excess of 1:5
billion USD. This conrms the general point that predation is a lot more
costly as a form of extraction than taxation. The former is a form of anarchy
while the latter typically requires a state that exercises a monopoly of force.
The paper belongs to a wider literature on the value of establishing the
rule of law and its role in securing trade and investment.3 A traditional
problem in weakly-institutionalized environments is that bringing goods to
market is subject to predation and theft. The consequences of the failure
to establish and enforce property rights is a core theme in the development
literature, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). The large
literature on the economic costs of corruption, another form of widely ob-
served extra-legal transfers is also relevant.4
Piracy has always posed a particular issue because of the di¢ culty of
securing international agreement over whose responsibility it is to deal with
the problem and how the costs are shared. Private solutions to increase
security such as carrying guards aboard ships are inherently less e¢ cient
compared to dealing with the public good of security for all.5 Our calculation
of the welfare cost gives a sense of the magnitude of this benet and we discuss
why this is so high compared to tax-based redistribution.
Insecurity due to piracy causes a rise in shipping costs which are an im-
3See Dixit (2004) and Rose-Ackerman (2010) for excellent overviews and Olken and
Barron (2009) for a recent contribution using data from Indonesia.
4For a survey and overview, see Olken and Pande (2011).
5See Bandiera (2003) for a similar argument.
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portant part of total trade costs. In this respect, our paper relates to studies
of the consequences of trade costs for trade patterns.6 Feyrer (2009) relates
in his study of the Suez Canal closure 1967-1975. Our welfare calculations
build on his ndings.
One of the central di¢ culties in combatting predation due to piracy is the
need for international cooperation. There is a classic public good problem
with the usual potential for free-riding. And this appears to have been a
major issue historically. For example, the correspondent report on Chinese
piracy in The London and China Telegraph from 4th February 1867 noted
that
Besides we are not the only Power with large interests at
stake. French, Americans, and Germans carry on an extensive
trade [...] Why should we then incur singly the expense of sup-
pressing piracy if each provided a couple of gunboats the force
would su¢ ce for the safety foreign shipping which is all that de-
volves upon [..] why should the English tax payer alone bear the
expense?
While the international community has now attempted to introduce naval
patrols to combat Somali piracy, this is extremely expensive and requires
international diplomacy between a range of states.7 In the end, the most
promising long-term solution would seem to be to restore a functional Somali
state which can deny pirates safe haven, thereby dealing with the problem
at source.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we discuss the piracy data and develop a statistical model of pirate attacks.
In section three, we introduce the time charter data and discuss how piracy
a¤ects shipping costs. Section four presents our estimation results and ro-
bustness checks. Section ve provides a theoretical framework of the welfare
loss and combines the framework with our estimates to derive a range for the
welfare loss from piracy. Concluding comments are in section six.
6For a review see Behar and Venables (2011). See Donaldson (2010) for a recent study
of the impact of a change in trade costs due to the advent of railroads in India.
7China has recently sent military ships into the Indian Ocean who coordinate with the
Indian navy - a sign that piracy now threatens even trade through the Indian Ocean.
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2 Forecasting Piracy Attacks
Insurers and shippers need to be able to forecast piracy attacks in order to
respond to the risk that it poses. Whether explicit or not, this means having
a model of piracy to predict future pirate attacks. In this section, we propose
a Markov switching model between two latent states representing weak and
strong law and order. We also allow seasonal weather conditions to inuence
the level of piracy attacks. We use the model to forecast monthly piracy
attacks. Below, we will compare this approach to some simpler models to
reassure ourselves that the specic structure alone is not driving the results.
2.1 Background and Data
Modern piracy is an organized and sophisticated crime.8 Our data on such
attacks comes from the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) annual
reports which provide the exact position of the attack, details on the ship
and its status (anchored or steaming) and the type of attack (attempted,
boarded, red upon, hijacked).9
We coded attacks by their geo-code and focus on two main areas where
piracy is most prevalent for the period 2003 to 2010. Both of these areas are
shown in gure 1. The rst is the Somalia area, which we dene geograph-
ically as the rectangle spanned by the coordinates S11, E38.4 and N18.3,
E74.7. The second area is the broader Indonesia area, that includes the
Strait of Malacca. We dene this area through the coordinates S10, E95.8
and N7.4, E120.7.
The red dots denote the locations of the piracy attacks. We focus on
these areas because we believe that there are common factors driving piracy
attacks within these zones, i.e. if pirates attack in some part of the area, it is
informative about the likelihood of an attack elsewhere within it. For Somali
pirates this is well documented. Given that the Indonesia area is smaller,
our assumption does not seem unrealistic there either. Figure 1 also depicts
two more geographically narrower areas, the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of
Malacca, which we use as a robustness check on our results below.
There is considerable variation in the intensity of attacks over time. Fig-
ure 2 summarizes the time dimension of attacks in both Somalia (left) and In-
donesia (right). Piracy in Indonesia has been the object of a longer-standing
8See Leeson (2007) for a discussion of the organization of piracy in history.
9We discuss our data in the appendix A. Table A1 provides summary statistics.
5
international e¤orts to police the area by the governments of Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia. Figure 2 shows a distinct shift in the amount of at-
tacks in 2005. Today, the problem is deemed to be largely well-contained.10
Acts of piracy o¤ the coast of Somalia have intensied more recently;
there was an average of 1.7 attacks per month before 2008 and 11 per month
from 2008 onwards. Pirates initially masqueraded as coast guards protecting
Somali territorial waters from illegal shing. This cloaked a build up of
organized violence. According to Hansen (2009), a key trigger for the upsurge
in violence was when the Puntland government in Somalia decided, due to a
crisis in the public nances, that it could no longer a¤ord to pay the police.
Thus, the primary reason for intensication was the break down in law and
order in Somalia which made it increasingly feasible for pirates to operate
without sanction.
We attribute the main time series variation in piracy attacks to variation
in law and order both on the high seas and surrounding area. In the case of
Somalia, the break down of the state of Somalia which made it infeasible for
the local government to control attacks in 2008. In the case of Indonesia the
main shift seems to be due to the strength of cooperative interventions by
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia following three-way talks in September
2005.
2.2 A Simple Model
Suppose that in region r, there are Mr active pirate ships and that in each
period each pirate receives an opportunity to hijack a ship where Virt is the
10The Joint War Committe crossed the Strait of Malacca from its list of high
risk areas in 2006, http://www.lloyds.com/News-and-Insight/News-and-Features/
Archive/2006/08/Market\_removes\_Malacca\_Straits\_from\_the\_List, accessed
on 11.04.2012.
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benet and cirt is the cost.11 Pirate i in region r at date t will launch an
attack if the expected benet exceeds the cost:
rtVirt  cirt
where rt is the region specic success probability, Virt is the value of a
successful attack and cirt is the cost. We allow the success probability, rt, to
depend on climatic conditions and the law and order situation in the region,
e.g. whether piracy attacks are policed and there is a safe haven available in
which to demand a ransom.
A key parameter is the cost-benet ratio irt = cirt=Virt. We suppose
that irt is drawn for each pirate ship i in region r at date t from a uni-
form distribution on [0; 1]. Given Mr independent draws then the expected
number of pirate attacks in region r at date t is given by:
E [art] = rtMr: (1)
According to this mode, forecasting piracy attacks means predicting how rt
is likely to vary over time.
2.3 Law and Order
We allow the probability of a successful pirate attack to depend on a latent
state, ` 2 fS;Wg with  (S) <  (W ) where S stands for strongand W
for weak. We are assuming that the probability of successfully hijacking a
ship and demanding a ransom is higher when law and order is weak. Using
this in equation (1), the mean number of pirate attacks in state ` is
r`   (`)Mr; ` 2 fS;Wg :
11To endogenizeMr, suppose that there is a xed cost becoming an active pirate. Then
we would have that a priate will enter if
E fVirt   cirt : rtg > Fir
in which case we would also predict that Mr would be a function of rt, i.e.
Mrt = H (rt) :
So we would have
E [art] = rtH (rt)
and the expected number of pirate attacks will still depend on rt reecting underlying
law and order.
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where rS < rW .
Dynamics across law and order states are modeled as a Markov chain
governing the process of state transitions. We show in the appendix that
this model gives the following formula corresponding to equation (1) for the
expected number of attacks at t+ 1 :
E [art+1] = 
r + (rW   rS)rP (`rt = W ) (2)
where 
r is a region-specic constant, r is a measure of persistence of the
process and P (`rt = W ) is the probability that region r is in the weak state at
time t.12 The latter is the only time-varying factor in equation (2) and evolves
according to the history of piracy attacks. By estimating the parameters of
the underlying process, we can construct an empirical counterpart to (1).
The model has some special features. First, the process driving law and
order is xed exogenously. And the assumption of two states is special.
What makes these compromises attractive, however, is the fact that it gives
us a lter for emerging data on pirate attacks which can be used to construct
a forecast for pirate attacks which can capture the sharp non-linear pattern
in the data, especially in Somalia, in a way that can be mapped back to an
underlying theory. This type of model, rst proposed in Hamilton (1989), has
been popular among time series economists modeling the non-linear proper-
ties of business cycle uctuations. Below, we will compare it to some less
structured approaches.
The model has six parameters for each region. Two state-specic means,
two persistence parameters which together determine r and two state-specic
variances. The model is estimated by using the data on attacks in a lter
provided by Hamilton (1989). One way of estimating the parameters of the
piracy process is the Expectation Maximization (EM) Algorithm described in
Hamilton (1990) which generates an estimate of the parameters by iteration
and is easy to implement.13
To use the model to forecast piracy attacks, we use the observed number
of attacks in month t to calculate the probability P (`rt = W ) that a region
is in a weak state given a set of known parameters. Equation (2) shows
that if P (`rt = W ) increases then the expected value of attacks next month
increases by (^rW   ^rS) ^r.
12P (`rt =W ) ; is a function of the particular history of attacks in region r in month t
and the set of Markov chain parameters r:
13We discuss estimation in appendix B.2.
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Estimates for (^rW   ^rS) ^r for Somalia (Panel A) and Indonesia (Panel
B) are given in the rst row of each panel in Table 1. We estimate the mean
number of pirate attacks in Somalia when law and order is weak to be around
15 (column 1) and around 2 when law and order is strong (column 2). The
corresponding gures for Indonesia are around 9 and 4. The persistence
estimate is given in column (3).14 The predictions of the tted model for
Somalia (left) and Indonesia (right) are summarized in gure 3. The graphs
show the actual number of attacks as a dotted line and the expected number
of attacks next month as a solid line. The abrupt swings in the forecast
number of attacks are driven by changes in P (`rt = W ) between values that
are close to zero and one while the impact of the estimated probability on
expectations is driven by our estimate of (^rW   ^rS) ^r.
As a reality check, it is interesting to observe that the predictions made by
our model are very much in line with the risk evaluations of the marine hull
war insurance business in the London market. Their representative, the Joint
War Committee, took the Strait of Malacca o¤ its list of areas under special
war risk in August 2006 and added the Gulf of Aden in May 2008. This
suggests that we are capturing some common-sense features of the pattern
of piracy attacks.
2.4 Seasonality
The baseline model identies law and order as the only underlying cause
of uctuations in piracy attacks over time. However, there is a pronounced
seasonal pattern that can also be incorporated into the empirical model. Ev-
idence for the Somali region suggests that pirate vessels there are vulnerable
to weather conditions. Most of the attacks are carried out using small ves-
sels, known as ski¤s. These are typically between 7 10 meters long and
at most two meters wide with a low freeboard. This renders them particu-
larly vulnerable to wind and waves.15 According to analyses by UN bodies,
attacks in the area of Somalia are almost absent during the Monsoon season
but resume after winds calm.16 This reasoning leads us to expect a nega-
14For an explanation see the appendix. In Somalia persistence is calculated from ^r =
0:92 + 0:95  1 and in Indonesia as ^r = 0:95 + 0:97  1.
15The O¢ ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI), a U.S. navy think tank, publishes the Piracy
Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) which uses weather data to predict piracy risks
in the Somalia area.
16See UNOSAT (2010). We conrm this in appendix A4.
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tive correlation between the intensity of attacks and seasonal conditions such
as wave height or wind speed. We now generalize the model to allow for
seasonality.
Suppose that there is now a month specic shock to the success probabil-
ity, rt. Now the average number of pirate attacks will be month dependent
and equation (1) generalizes to
rm` = r (`)wrmMr (3)
where wrm is the mean weathershock to piracy success in month m in re-
gion r. This allows us to rewrite the mean number of attacks as an interaction
between an indicator for the weak and strong state I [` = j] ; j 2 fS;Wg and
a monthly mean of attacks during times of weak and strong law and order,
rmW and rmS:
rm` = I [` = W ]rmW + I [` = S]rmS:
Thus, we have a month-dependent mean in the underlying Markov chain
which switches between strong and weak law and order.
The forecast number of attacks at t + 1 when that month is m is now a
function of the probability of the weak state in t and the mean of attacks
during weak and strong law and order states for t + 1. Thus (2) generalizes
to:
E [amrt+1] = 
mr + (rmW   rmS)rP (srt = W ) (4)
where 
mr is again a constant (now specic to month m and region r).17
Table 1 summarizes the results from estimating this generalized model.
Panel A shows results for the Somalia region. Column (1) contains our es-
timate of the monthly means: ^r1W ; ^r2W ; :::; ^r12W . The estimates show a
clear seasonal pattern of attacks with the month of March and April being
particularly active in terms of piracy.18 Not surprisingly, there is less season-
ality in the strong law and order state (column (2)). Column (3) gives our
estimate of the persistence of the law and order states. Compared to row (1)
persistence has increased slightly. This is mostly because variation in attacks
17We can directly apply the estimation method described above to a richer parametriza-
tion with 28 parameters.
18In appendix A4 we show that monthly average wind speed is highly correlated with
the our estimates ^rmW : We can therefore interpret these parameters as being driven by
exogenous weather variation.
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is attributed to seasonality instead of the underlying state. In column (4)
we show the impact of the state of law and order on expected piracy attacks
next month.
It is instructive to consider how our monthly forecast responds to observ-
ing the upsurge in pirate attacks in May 2008. In our model this corresponds
to a switch the state of law and order from 0 to 1. According to the estimates
in column (4) in Table 1 induces a change in the forecast number of attacks
in June by around 10 whereas for July, weak law and order is associated with
fewer than one pirate attack due to seasonality in weather conditions.
Panel B in Table 1 shows the results for Indonesia. Although present in
the data, seasonality is generally less important than in Somalia. The change
in forecast piracy attacks induced by moving from weak to strong law and
order are also generally smaller.
2.5 Comparison to an AR(2) model
As a comparator for the Markov chain model, we also tted an AR(2) process
to the pattern of attacks in each region so that
E [art+1] = b^0r + b^1rart + b^2rart 1:
We can compare the results for this case to the more structured approach
laid out above.
Figure 4 compares the predictive power of the seasonal Markov Chain
model (lled out dots) compared to the AR(2) process (hollow dots). Devia-
tions from the 45 degree line indicate prediction errors. Clearly the seasonal
Markov chain model predicts attacks much better than the AR(2) process.19
This is driven by the seasonal information used in the seasonal Markov chain
model. The AR(2) process interprets a low level of attacks as a sign of
pirate inactivity. The seasonal Markov chain model compares the level of
attacks to the level of attacks typical for that month. The absence of attacks
during Monsoon is then not interpreted as evidence that piracy has been
defeated which seems sensible.
19A regression of attacks on the predicted values from the Markov chain model yields
a R-sq of 0.8 compared to 0.5 in the AR(2) process. Appendix table A2 reports these
regressions.
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3 The Cost of Piracy Attacks
We now turn to estimating the impact of forecast piracy attacks on shipping
costs using data on chartering contracts in the dry bulk shipping industry.
We begin by discussing some of the costs of piracy and how they are shared.
We then introduce our data and estimation.
3.1 Cost Factors
There have been a number of costly private responses to the piracy threat.
A variety of insurance arrangements have emerged to cover piracy risks with
higher premia being paid to travel in areas deemed to be at risk. Ships in-
creasingly carry armed guards and other preventive measures (mostly modi-
cations to ship hulls) have become "best practice" which makes them relevant
for insurance purposes.20 In extreme cases, ships can re-route although that
would mean foregoing the considerable time and distance saving from using
the Suez canal.
The costs to the shipping industry can be decomposed into ve main
categories: (i) damage to vessels (ii) loss of hire and delay to cargo delivery
while a ship is held to ransom (iii) costs of defensive measures (iv) cost of
ransoms paid when a crew is kidnapped or a vessel is held (v) re-routing of
vessels to avoid areas at risk. We discuss these cost factors in detail in Ap-
pendix (C). Ship owners typically buy insurance to cover themselves against
a number of these costs with insurance costs being sensitive to developments
in the number of piracy attacks.
Our window on measuring costs is through shipping contracts whose
prices adjust to reect the above costs to the extent that they are borne by
the ship owner and shifted to the charterer. This is not unrealistic. The as-
sociation of independent tanker owners, for example, provides model clauses
for chartering agreements with regard to piracy risks, stating that:21
"Charterers shall indemnify Owners against all liabilities costs
and expenses arising out of actual or threatened acts of piracy or
20Best Practice manuals are published and updated regularly by the shipping in-
dustry. See http://www.mschoa.org/bmp3/Documents/BMP4\%20low\%20resolution\
%20(3).pdf, accessed on 10.04.2012.
21Refer to http://www.intertanko.com/upload/Prlse\%20piracy\%20clauses\
%202.09.doc, accessed on 10.04.2012.
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any preventive or other measures taken by Owners [...], including
but not limited to additional insurance premiums, additional crew
costs and costs of security personnel or equipment.
Hence, there are good reasons for believing that the lions share of these
costs ultimately falls on charterers who compensate ship owners in the form of
higher charter prices.22. Below, we will discuss the sensitivity of our estimates
regarding the division of these costs.
3.2 Data on Shipping Contracts
Our shipping price data comes from the web-site of N. Cotzias Shipping
Consultants which provides monthly reports on the time charter market for
the period November 2002 until December 2010.23 The data is comprised
of 33,529 individual charters in the dry bulk cargo segment of the market.
These are ships that transport primary commodities such as iron ore or
agricultural products such as grain. This variety of ship constitutes approx-
imately one third of the tonnage of the global shipping eet. Short term
chartering agreements are typical for bulk carrier ships, due to the volatile
nature of commodity markets. Since the starting point for these charter
agreements are previous agreements (last done), shipowners and charterers
take an active interest in reports of recent transactions.24 The individual
time charter agreements are also used to construct general shipping indices
such as the Baltic Exchange Dry Index (BDI). Thus our data-set provides
a window onto the wider shipping market.
In a time charter agreement the shipowner places his ship, with crew and
equipment, at the disposal of the charterer and bears the costs of keeping
the ship operational. The charterer pays a daily charter rate and decides
the type and quantity of cargo to be carried and the ports of loading and
discharging. The charterer is also responsible for paying bunkers (fuel) and
costs like port charges including the payments due, for example, for using the
22In the container shipping industry, region specic piracy surcharges of 5% of the base
rate or $300 per container are common. See http://www.joc.com/container-lines/
freight-rate-surcharge-update-week-april-2-6, accessed on 12.04.2012.
23In early 2011, Cotzias merged with Intermodial (www.intermodal.gr). As of 25th
January 2012, the Cotzias data was available on http://www.cotzias.gr/chart\_tc\
_rep.htm.
24See Stopford (2009) for a detailed discussion of the time charter market.
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Suez Canal. The fact that time charter rates are provided on a daily basis
makes them comparable across contracts of di¤ering length.
The summaries made available on the web-site provide, among other in-
formation, the name of the ship, its deadweight tonnage (DWT), the year it
was built, the port of origin and the port or country of destination. From
this information we construct our measure of shipping cost - the rate per
day per DWT. We also use the origin and destination to assign the ships
voyage to countries (appendix A.3). Most of the charters are from Asia with
China making up the bulk of origin and destination locations. Our data set
contains information on around 1600 distinct shipping routes.
3.3 Identifying Exposure to Piracy Risks
Our approach requires us to assign a risk of exposure to piracy attacks to each
route. We do this by using the information on the origin and destination of
the shipping contract. For example, a vessel with a destination in Germany
and an origin in China is quite likely to travel through both, the Somalia and
Indonesia area. However, there are some cases where it is not entirely clear
whether the vessel would travel on a Pacic route or an Indian Ocean and
Atlantic route using the Suez canal.
In assigning piracy risk, we therefore employ a path algorithm to obtain
an automatic coding of a route.25 We are then able to see whether the
shortest sea route passes though the piracy areas that we study. If it does,
then we will suppose that the shipping contract is subject to a piracy risk
based on the forecast number of attacks in the relevant region
Figure 5 provides a birds-eye view of the constructed trade-routes for
the areas around Somalia. Thicker lines indicate more charter agreements on
that trade lane. The bottom right of gure 5 illustrates the bulk trade net-
work allocated to port of Surabaya (Indonesia). Overall, we observe around
7,100 charters for routes going through the Somalia area and 10,600 charters
through the Indonesia area.
This approach means that we are only able to assign an intention to treat
(ITT) rather than the treatment itself. It is, for example, possible that some
ships were re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid exposure to
piracy risks. One way to investigate how important such re-routing is to
regress monthly Suez canal tra¢ c (in deadweight tons) on attacks in the
25Details are discussed in the appendix A.3.
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Somalia region. This is reported in Table 2. The sign on attacks is negative
but the coe¢ cient is insignicant. To control for the e¤ect of world trade
caused by the nancial crisis, we add a dummy variable for the period after
the Lehman Brothers collapse which is strongly negative and signicant. The
results in Table 2 do not suggest that seasonal patterns in shipments through
the Suez Canal are related to pirate attacks. This supports the view of other
commentators, such as One Earth Future (2011), that re-routing around the
Cape is not important.
3.4 Piracy Costs and Shipping Prices
Our core specication assumes that the dry bulk shipping market is con-
testable so that pricing is based on the average cost per day for each voy-
age.26 We would then expect prices in that market to reect expected piracy
attacks and any other factors that inuence costs. We denote the cost per
dead weight ton (DWT) per day for a ship of size s on route d in month t as:
C (s; d; t; Adt)
where Adt is the forecast number of attacks a¤ecting route d at date t.27
An e¤ect of piracy on costs is not unrealistic as the shipping conditions at
so-called "choke points" (the straits of Hormuz and Malacca, the Suez and
Panama canals, the Bosporus) are known to a¤ect freight rates.28 Since there
are scale economies in shipping, we expect this cost function to be decreasing
in s.
For simplicity, we adopt the specication:
logC (s; d; t; Adt) = c (s; d; t) + Adt + xdst + dst (5)
where  is the core parameter of interest, xdst are other time varying controls
and dst captures other idiosyncratic factors which are uncorrelated with Adt.
26See Behar and Venables (2011) for a discussion of the extent of contestability in
shipping markets. This is important for our interpretation since otherwise there would
be a markup of prices over costs reecting the extent to which ship owners have market
power. In that case, part of the cost of piracy could be absorbed in lower prots.
27Due to the absence of good monthly data on ship tra¢ c for our period 2002-2010 we
have to use Adt as a measure of piracy risk. This disregards the fact that dense tra¢ c
makes journeys less risky for each ship.
28See, for example, the discussion at the Baltic Exchange under http://www.
balticexchange.com/default.asp?action=article\&ID=3.
15
The cost from piracy depends on the route that the ship takes. As we
have already discussed, we construct two treatment indicators for each route
depending on whether it passes through the area of Somalia or Indonesia.
Denote this as a dummy variable where dr = 1 if route d passes through
piracy region r. Then:
Adt = dr  E [art+1] :
is our measure of the cost shock expected on route d where, in the core
specication, the forecast is generated by (4). In the basic specication, we
do not allow treatment to vary with ship size, s, or route, d. However, we
will also allow for a heterogeneous e¤ect in some specications that we report
below.
To reect this discussion, our core empirical specication is:
zisdt = s + d + t + w + Adt + xdt + "isdt (6)
where zisdt is the (log of) daily charter rate per DWT for contract i on a
ship of size s, for route d in month t. The parameters (s; d; t) are xed
e¤ects for ship size, route and month. The standard error "isdt is adjusted
for clustering at the route level. Other controls in xdt include the age of
the ship and the ballast bonus per DWT (a bonus paid for empty return
journeys).
The main parameter of interest is  which we interpret as the additional
shipping cost from anticipated piracy attacks. We are expecting that  > 0.
The empirical approach can be thought of as a di¤erence-in-di¤erence speci-
cation where ships that pass through regions where pirates are expected to
attack are compared to ships using di¤erent routes over the same time pe-
riod. This exploits time-series variation in forecast piracy attacks depending
on their past history and seasonal weather conditions.
3.5 Core Results
Our core results are reported in Table 3 which uses the specication in (6).
In column (1), forecast piracy attacks are generated using equation (2)
for each of our two regions. The only controls are xed e¤ects for route,
time and ship size. For the latter, the omitted ship size category is "small"
capesize ships between 80,000 and 150,000 DWTs. There is a strongly
signicant positive coe¢ cient on the expected number of attacks. The point
estimate says that one extra anticipated attack in a month increases the daily
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charter rate by a little over 1% in the Somalia region with no signicant e¤ect
for charters that pass through the Indonesia region. While attacks in the
Indonesia continue, it is unlikely that there is much learning going on over
this period and most of the e¤ect is probably already absorbed in the route
xed e¤ect.29 Since the mean di¤erence in pirate attacks between high and
low law and order states is around 11, this suggests that shipping costs were
around 11% higher after the break down in law and order in Somalia which
lead to increased piracy attacks.
The ship size dummy variables show evidence of signicant scale economies
in shipping with the smallest ships being around 63% more expensive per
DWT than the excluded category. The point estimates decline across the
ship size categories. This is a feature of all the estimates that we show.
It is important to observe that, by including time dummy variables (for
each month), we are controlling for general trends in the global shipping
market. These are important over this period given that the economic crisis
erupts around 2008 while the capacity of bulk shipping grows considerably.
For this to create a problem for us, it would have to be the case that the
routes that we have classied as being treated are di¤erentially a¤ected by
changes in market conditions in a way that increases shipping costs of bulk
shipping. The main trend in this period is, however, a switch of bulk trade
in Asia away from Europe and towards other Asian countries, Australia and
the Americas.30 This would work against us as it would put a downward
pressure on prices for bulk charter agreements between Europe and Asia.
In column (2), we forecast attacks allowing for month specic e¤ects as
in equation (4). The e¤ect of forecast attacks in the Somalia region remains
positive and signicant although the average e¤ect is somewhat lower than
in column (1). This suggests an overall e¤ect due to the break down of law
and order in Somalia of a little less than 10%. However, the e¤ect across
months is heterogeneous. The di¤erence between forecast attacks from the
period March-May compared to the summer monsoon season June-August
is 19:66. This implies a change in shipping costs of more than 14% between
spring and the Monsoon season.
Column (3) adds two additional ship controls: ballast bonus payments
and the vessels age. We nd a large variation in rates paid for younger
29An alternative interpretation is that increased military presence by Malaysia, Indone-
sia and Singapore in this period prevents an impact of piracy. See, for example, http:
//www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1893032,00.html\#ixzz1kaNw1NTq.
30See the detailed discussion in UNCTAD 2011 and UNCTAD 2010.
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compared to older vessels with chartering rates for older vessels being signif-
icantly lower. However, the point estimates on forecast piracy attacks do
not change much after adding these controls.
In column (4), we use only data after Somali piracy increased in May
2008. The variation in forecast piracy attacks is now identied purely from
the seasonal (i.e. monthly) di¤erences due to weather. It is encouraging
to observe that the sign and signicance of the Piracy e¤ect remains even
though the size of the e¤ect is much smaller. However, this is not surprising
given that we are, in e¤ect, throwing away the variation due to the main
breakdown in law and order in Somalia that precipitated the large increase
in piracy attacks.
Column (5) explores whether there is a heterogeneous e¤ect across the
di¤erent ship sizes travelling through the Somalia area. Due to the precision
of the estimates, we can not discern statistically distinct patterns across ship
types, except for the very small and very large vessels. The latter observation
can be thought of as a robustness check, as the largest Capesize vessels cannot
use the Suez Canal.31
Overall, these results suggest that piracy in the Somalia area has a posi-
tive e¤ect on the cost of shipping through this region. This is true across the
specications that we report in Table 3. It now remains to assess whether the
results are sensitive to two main types of robustness check: (i) di¤erent ways
of forecasting piracy attacks and (ii) di¤erent ways of assigning treatment.
3.6 Alternative Forecasts of Pirate Attacks
We rst consider how the results vary according to the model that is used to
forecast piracy attacks. The results are shown in Table 4.
In column (1) we use the estimated probability of a weak state of law
and order as an explanatory variable for shipping cost, i.e. P (`rt = W ) in
equation (2) is used directly as a regressor. The magnitude comes close to
the estimate we obtained previously suggesting increases in shipping costs
between 10% to 15%.32
31We refrain from coding this category as not treated as some capesize vessels do travel
through the Suez Canal (broad vessels and ships in ballast).
32In the container shipping industry, region specic piracy surcharges of $300 per con-
tainer are common already, see for example http://www.joc.com/container-lines/
freight-rate-surcharge-update-week-april-2-6. This corresponds to roughly 9.03%
of the price of sending a 40 foot container from Shanghai to Europe in March 2010, ac-
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Column (2) can be thought of as a robustness check for our EM lter
with monthly- and state specic mean levels of attacks. We argued that the
signicant within-year variation in attacks is due to seasonal wind patterns
that a¤ect the success probability, which is itself dependent on the state of
law and order. Hence, it makes sense to study whether observed monthly
wind speeds, interacted with the probability of the state of law and order
being weak, generates similar results to our more sophisticated EM lter.
The results suggest that, conditional on the state of law and order being
weak, the anticipated drop in wind speeds from its highs in June and July to
its lows in February and March give an increase in shipping cost by 11.3%.
Taking the seasonal variation and the jump in costs brought about by the
change in the state of law and order together, we nd that the increase in
shipping costs is somewhere between 8.2% and 19.5%. Not surprisingly, wind
speed does not predict variation in prices in Indonesia.
In column (3) we use an AR(2) specication to predict attacks. Our
regressions indicate that attacks in t can be predicted by attacks in t 1 and
t  2 in Somalia but are harder to predict in Indonesia. Accordingly, we nd
only signicant e¤ects for Somalia. The magnitude of the e¤ect is rather
similar to using the Markov chain based estimates. Thus, our particular
forecasting model does not seem to be driving the results.
In column (4) of Table 4 we simply include the number of attacks as a
regressor rather than trying to forecast future attacks based on past data.
This would be justied in a world where participants in the shipping market
are myopic and simply assume that pirate attacks next month are the same as
pirate attacks in the current month. Here too we nd a positive and signicant
coe¢ cient on the charter rate in the Somalia region with no signicant e¤ect
of attacks in Indonesia. This reinforces the idea that the specic forecast
model is not driving everything. However, the size of the e¤ect is somewhat
di¤erent with something like a 6% e¤ect of pirate attacks on shipping costs
after 2008 being predicted. But this naive forecasting model does a poor
job at capturing some of the seasonal and persistent factors that charterers
ought to consider when trying to forecast attacks.
Column (5) addresses the concern that we have failed to pick up the
economic downturn in 2008 properly in our specication to the extent that
this di¤erentially impacted some routes. We therefore add GDP growth
controls for the origin and destination of each route. Due to the coarseness
cording to the Shanghai Freight Register.
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of (especially) the destination data, discussed further in Appendix A, we were
forced to aggregate to regional GDP for this exercise. Controlling for either
annual regional GDP levels (regressions not shown), interpolated monthly
regional GDP levels (regressions not show) or regional GDP growth, as shown
in column (5) does not change the pattern of coe¢ cients. In particular, the
coe¢ cient on expected piracy attacks in Somalia does not change. However,
forecast piracy attacks in Indonesia do now become (marginally) signicant
in this specication.
In column (6) we add time trends that di¤er according to the starting
location of the vessel. While the point estimate on forecast piracy attacks
falls slightly, it remains highly signicant.
Taken together these results reinforce condence in the ndings in Table
3. Our nding that pirate attacks in the region of Somalia increase shipping
costs is robust to adding further controls and to di¤erent ways of forecasting
pirate attacks at the time of writing a chartering contract.
3.7 Alternative Treatment Denitions
In order to match the piracy data with the shipping data, it is necessary
to impose some structure by dening regions that are susceptible to piracy.
We assigned routes to the treatment group if the computed shortest path of
the route crossed one of our regions. But evidently, there is some leeway in
how this could be done and, in the following specications, we show that our
results are robust to various ways of assigning the treatment and denitions
of piracy threat areas. The results are shown in Table 5.
In column (1) we use more narrowly dened piracy regions focusing on
two key choke points: the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca.33 We use
the monthly Markov Chain estimates to forecast attacks in these areas. The
results show that piracy in the Gulf of Aden still has a signicantly positive
impact on shipping prices through that area. The size of the e¤ect is smaller
than when we estimate the impact of piracy from the region as a whole.34
Column (2) shows the results when we attempt to disentangle the e¤ect
of Somali (Indonesian) piracy on trade through the Gulf of Aden (Strait of
33For the Malacca strait we use the maritime area bounded by latitude 2 [1; 7:4] and
longitude 2 [95:8; 104:7]. For the Gulf of Aden, the bounding box is given by latitude
2 [10:5; 17] and longitude 2 [40; 52:2].
34This is not surprising. Piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden feature much weaker seasonal
patterns.
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Malacca) from the e¤ect on trade in the broader regions. We now use the
number of forecast attacks from our main specication and apply it to two
subgroups of maritime routes: a) ships that travel through the Gulf of Aden
(Strait of Malacca) and b) ships that travel through Somalia (Indonesia),
but not through the Gulf of Aden (Strait of Malacca). The key insight from
this specication is that we also nd a cost of piracy for routes that do not
travel through the Gulf of Aden but through the broader Somalia area. The
magnitude of this e¤ect is smaller with an increase in prices after 2008 of
4:65% (0:00334  13:92). This suggests that routes between the Middle East
and the Far East/Africa are a¤ected by Somali piracy. This observation will
be important when we come to calculate the welfare cost below.
Columns (3) and (4) look at robustness regarding the treatment. We
need to be wary that ships could be travelling alternative routes in order to
avoid the piracy regions. We would expect such re-routing to be more of an
issue for maritime routes for which there is a feasible alternative route which
does not use the Gulf of Aden and which is not signicantly longer than
passing through the piracy region. To examine this, we used our algorithm
to compute alternative routes while adding the constraint that vessels cannot
travel through the Gulf of Aden. We then assign treatment based on these
alternative routes if they are at most 10% (column (3)) or 20% (column (4))
longer than the Gulf of Aden route. The point estimate for the Somalia area
hardly changes at all for this alternative way of attributing treatment.
However, if we look at Indonesia the point estimate is now positive and
signicant at 5% when we consider the 20% rerouting exercise. We look
into this further by looking into the pattern of routes that are re-routed
in this case and nd that most of the re-routing takes place on routes be-
tween Europe and China, Japan and Korea.35 These are now assigned to
take the Pacic route, hence avoiding both Somali and Indonesian piracy.
The remainder of routes receiving the Indonesian treatment are thus mainly
carrying regional trade. This may explain why we observe signicant e¤ects
in this case, as regional trades are subject to additional risks such as theft
while at anchorage, a type of attack which is particularly common in this
area.36
352064 obervations are re-assigned treatment in the Somalia area, 1354 observations
have a di¤erent treatment in the Indonesia area.
36In a further specication, not shown, we observe similar patterns when interacting
piracy treatment with the intensity of treatment as proxied by the share of the overall
distance travelled through piracy areas. We observe that the cost e¤ect is highest for
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Once again, these robustness checks increase our condence in the results
and the proposition that shipping costs increase due to the risk of maritime
piracy attacks.
4 The Welfare Cost of Piracy
We now discuss what our results imply for the welfare cost of piracy. Our
welfare criterion takes the transfer from consumers of traded goods (who
ultimately bear the cost) to pirates as given. We ask what an e¢ cient transfer
of the same magnitude would cost the consumers and compare this to the
costs that piracy imposes. To get a more complete measure, we will also add
estimates of the costs of policing piracy through military ships using data
from other sources.
4.1 Framework
Piracy leads to a transfer of resources to pirates via ransoms. Resources are
used by pirates in securing these ransoms and by ship owners and govern-
ments in resisting them. The costs of the ransoms and damage to ships are
also borne directly by those who pay them. These costs are pooled across
the industry through insurance. Resources are also used in writing insurance
costs. As with any transfer program, there is a question of who pays in the
end. If the market for shipping is competitive then any increased cost must
be paid by consumers of the nal goods in the form of higher prices.
Suppose that there is a composite traded good, X, for trade between
locations which is susceptible to piracy attacks. Suppose that shipping
demand has a xed coe¢ cient technology so that demand for shipping is X.
The number X is best thought of as ton days, i.e. as the number of shipped
tons multiplied by the average maritime journey time.37 We assume that the
good X is sold in a competitive market and that the marginal cost per unit
is denoted as  + where  is the production cost and  is the shipping cost
per unit. Suppose that there is a representative consumer with utility U (X)
and additive quasi-linear utility. This allows us to ignore general equilibrium
dyads for which a signicant proportion of the overall journey is through piracy areas.
37This view is very much in line with the usual measure of mile tons. For an interesting
discussion regarding this see Stopford (2009). We disregard variable shipping speeds which
makes the two measures equivalent.
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e¤ects. The representative consumers optimal consumption is given by:
U 0

X^ ( + )

=  + 
and the indirect utility from consuming tradeable goods of the relevant kind
is
V ( + ) = U

X^ ( + )

  X^ ( + ) [ + ] :
As we have already seen, piracy increases shipping costs. Suppose that part
of that cost increase leads to a transfer to pirates denoted by T and that that
we attach a welfareweight of  to these transfers, i.e. to pirate welfare. It
is somewhat debatable what this weight should be. Ransoms transfer income
to a poor country (Somalia) but they go to a particular group, i.e. organized
criminals. It is far from clear how these benets may trickle down to the
wider population.38 We feel that it is best to be agnostic about this and base
our welfare approach on Coate (2000). Using his reasoning, we should care
principally that any transfer made to pirates is accomplished in the most
e¢ cient way and hence the welfare loss are the resources spent in the process
of delivering the transfer.
For xed , welfare is
W () = V ( + ) + T:
Now suppose that, as above, the cost of shipping nal goods is
 () =  [c+]
where  is the increase in transport costs per unit of nal of goods expressed
in US$.
The part of the cost (again in US$) that is a transfer to pirates is denoted
by  (). And the total transfer received by pirates is
T () =  () X^ ( +  [c+]) :
In order to be agnostic about , suppose we were to replace piracy with a tax
on shipping, the proceeds of which were transferred to the pirates and which
gave the same amount of net revenues as they now receive from engaging in
38Shortland (2011) provides some evidence that piracy revenue trickles into Somali so-
ciety and has a positive developmental e¤ect.
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piracy. Proposing a tax on shipping seems more reasonable than considering
lump-sum taxation in this instance and it would clearly fall on the same
group as those who currently bear the cost of piracy.
The amount of the required unit tax, t; is dened by
tX^ ( +  [c+ t]) =  () X^ ( +  [c+]) : (7)
This equation illustrates the source of the ine¢ ciency of piracy attacks. The
increase in charter rates  due to piracy is not fully captured by the pirates
so that t <  () < . Were the transfer e¢ cient then t =  () = .39
In other words, a tax has only the usual excess burden associated with it
while piracy leads to additional costs such as the costs from the guard labor
associated with combatting piracy, damage to ships, negotiation costs to
release hijacked ships and costs of additional insurance.
Since the tax keeps the transfer to pirates constant, the welfare cost of
piracy is measured by:
V ( +  [c+ t])  V ( +  [c+]) (8)
which, by construction, does not depend on the welfare weight .
4.2 Benchmark Estimate
Our benchmark estimate of the welfare cost assumes away any demand re-
sponse by consumers. Thus X^ ( +  [c+]) is completely inelastic and
t =  () : In this case (8) becomes:
L1 () = [   ()] X^: (9)
Estimates of this are in column (1) of Table (6). In Panel A we use the
detailed data available from the Suez Canal authority on the total amount of
tons shipped through the canal.40 We translate this number into an amount
of DWTdays by using the mean bulk ship speed (from Stopford, 2009) and
the average length of the trip in the respective sample.41 Panel B adds an
39Of course, a tax would be costly to administer and we are not including this in our
thought experiment. But evidently that could be part of the calculation too.
40See http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=7.
41We make the assumption all of this cargo is comparable to ours in terms of its exposure
to higher shipping costs, journey length and travels though the Gulf of Aden.
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estimate of the DWTdays that do not travel through the Gulf of Aden but
through the broader Somalia area.
To get a feel for the plausible range, we present three sets of estimates.42
Our low estimate uses the coe¢ cient from column (2) in Table 3. Our middle
estimate is calculated using the same coe¢ cient except that we use monthly
data of the tra¢ c through the Gulf of Aden and the monthly piracy projec-
tions from Table 1. The high estimate that we use is from column (1) of
Table 4.
We illustrate our calculations of L1 () with the low estimate in panel A
of Table 1. Column (1) applies our estimate in Table 3, column (2) and the
increase in expected attacks in Table 1 to the average rate charter rate of
0:4726: This yields the following estimate of total piracy costs:
 X^ = 0:00712  13:9  0:4726 30:3  646; 064; 000
= 915:6 million USD
for 2010.43 This is around around 113; 000 USD for a Panamax ship.
Our estimate of  ()  X^ is the gross ransoms paid less the costs in-
curred by pirates in generating this. A reasonable gure for the gross ran-
soms is 200 million USD. And netting out the costs of generating these,
suggest prots from piracy in the region of 120 million USD.44 Together with
our estimate of  X^ this sums to the number
L1 () = [915:6  120] million USD = 795:6 million USD.
Even from this low estimate it should become clear that the amount spent
due to piracy vastly exceeds what it should cost to buy o¤ the pirates, i.e.
to o¤er them a tax-based transfer of comparable magnitude.
Panel B shows, not surprisingly, that the estimated cost is much higher
when we calculate the value of shipping for the wider region including all
of Somalia. Even our low estimate of the welfare cost increases by around
40%.
42For details see the appendix (E).
43Obviously this number is subject to a large margin of error. For example, container
tra¢ c is likely to be less a¤ected. Were we to suppose that there was no e¤ect on container
ships then the size of the a¤ected deadweight tonnage would be only 279; 063; 000 and the
cost would be considerably lower. We abstract from this as the value of container goods
is likely to be much larger which would incease the cost.
44For a careful and transparent calculation see http://www.time.com/time/business/
article/0,8599,1891386,00.html. This is in line with estimates in Geopolicity (2011).
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Panel C adds in costs incurred by governments in policing piracy. Such
costs are typically tax nanced and additional to the costs that we have mea-
sured in our shipping cost estimates. They should be added to our welfare
loss calculation and, in theory, scaled by the marginal cost of public funds to
reect any deadweight loss in raising revenues to fund these operations. Our
medium estimate of this cost, for example, is at 640 million USD. The low
estimate in panel C is now 84% higher than in panel A. The range for the
welfare cost suggested by our benchmark estimates is $796 million to $2750
million.
4.3 Developing an Upper Bound
There are further reasons to believe that our estimates in column (1) of Table
6 are a lower bound. We now consider two of these: (i) the possibility of a
demand response which reduces trade and (ii) the possibility that only some
of the cost of piracy is paid by the charterer.45
Allowing for the possibility of a demand response, we show in the appen-
dix that the welfare loss caused by a decrease in trade can be approximated
by a simple scaling factor on our estimate above, which depends on the elas-
ticity of trade with respect to transport costs, ^; and is given by
L2 () = L1 ()

1 +
1
2
   ()
c+
^

: (10)
In other words, the loss due to trade reduction can be approximated by
the trade elasticity with respect to transport costs times the share of piracy
costs in total transport costs.46 Obviously, L2 () > L1 () as long as ^ > 0.
There are several possible numbers we could use for ^. Latest results from
Feyrer (2009) who uses the Suez Canal closure as a shock to distance and
calculates the e¤ects on trade from distance costs suggests that an estimate
between 0.2 and 0.5 for ^ is realistic. The estimate found in a meta study in
Disdier (2008) is 0.9. Given the similarity of the Feyrer (2009) study we use
the estimate of 0.5 in column 2 which suggests that L2 () = L1 ()1:0226.
45Similarly, if we believe that the market for ship capacity is not competitive, we could
see that piracy related expenses may be forwarded with a markup. This is a possibility
we do not explicitly consider further.
46Note that we calculate an upper bound this way as charter costs are just a part of
total (maritime) transport costs.
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The welfare loss due to changes in quantity are relatively marginal.47 This
insight is conrmed in Table 6 which provides the estimates corresponding
to Table 1 in all three panels.
Column (3) of Table 6 allows for the possibility that the increase in char-
tering rates fails to capture all of the additional costs imposed by piracy.
In particular, we check what would happen if costs were split between ship
owner and charterer according to the general average ruleas it is known
in the shipping industry. This rule shares the costs of saving the ship in
proportion to the value of the vessel and the cargo. Assume then that a
share  of the piracy costs are borne by the ship-owner. The charter rate
increase  is the transfer that compensates the owner for piracy costs over
and above what the charterer bears.48 Then if charter rates increase by 
due to shipping costs the overall cost to the industry is now given by 
2 1 .
This yields our third measure of welfare cost of:
L3 () =


2   1    ()

 X^: (11)
This leads to estimates that are somewhat larger than in column (1) of Table
6. For example, the low estimate allowing for general averaging is 130%
higher.
Adding all of our costs together, our largest estimates are in panel C
where the range is between 1:5 billion USD and 4:8 billion USD. While the
range of estimates is quite large, the comparison between these numbers of
the transfer received by pirates of only 120 million USD is telling. Taking our
medium estimates in all case, suggests that a reasonable range for the piracy
costs is given by the medium estimates in Panel C. This suggests a range for
the costs from piracy between 1:86 billion USD and 3:32 billion USD.
47This is not unrealistic. The import price of hard coal per metric ton in the rst
semester 2010 in the EU27 was over 240 $=ton. From our calculations above we know that
the average charter cost on the Aden route was about 14:3 $=ton so that a 10% increase
in this rate would have led to an increase of EU coal import prices of about 0.6 percent.
This is much less than the usual price variation from one month to the next.
48To get an intuition for the formula assume that the shipping cost is 100. The owner
has additional costs due to piracy of 20 and charterer pays 10. The charter rate will go up
by 10 due to piracy but overall costs due to piracy is 30. And, indeed, 12 1 =
1
2 23 1
= 3
in this case. The details on the calibration of  can be found in Appendix F.
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4.4 Predation versus Taxation
We can use equation (7) in the previous section to calculate t - the tax rate
on shipping through Aden that would yield the same revenue now going
to pirates. Disregarding the e¤ect on trade we get this tax rate from the
following calculation:
t =
 () X^ ( +  [c+])
X^ ( +  [c+])
=
120 million USD
0:4726  30:3  646; 064; 000 + 0:4648  20:67  445; 000; 000
= 0:009:
This implies that a tax rate of just 0:9 percent on chartering would be needed
to generate a transfer of comparable magnitude to that generated by piracy.
This contrasts with our estimates of the increase in shipping costs of between
10 and 30 percent. This calculation suggests that predatory activity of the
kind undertaken by pirates is between 10 and 30 times more costly as a means
of giving a similar level of resources to pirates than taxation would be.49
It is worth dwelling on the reason why these costs are so high and how
far they provide insight into debates about the costs of failure to establish
law and order. There are three key factors: (i) the fact that piracy causes
direct damage and loss (ii) the fact that e¤orts to establish law and order
are fragmented.
Direct damage comes partly from the damage to property. However, it also
comes in part from the fact that pirates have to hold ships for long enough
to establish their credibility. This is like an ine¢ cient war of attrition which
increases the cost of doing business and creates delay over and above the cost
of the ransom.50
When it comes to fragmented law and order, combatting piracy currently
has an array of actors all investing in the hope of dealing with the problem.
This includes the somewhat uncoordinated e¤orts of governments. The most
e¢ cient outcome would be to establish a monopoly of violence over the seas
49Of course, this thought experiment assumes naively that the pirates could be identied
and that they could be transfers similar to what they currently earn from piracy.
50For an analysis of a strikingly related ransom bargaining process see Ambrus et al.
(2011) who analyze ransom negotiations during a period of piracy in the Meditteranean
sea from 1575-1739.
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as we see in established states.51 Otherwise, each actor will invest until the
marginal benet equals the marginal cost.52 By protecting particular groups
this will tend to shift piracy to other vessels rather than reducing attacks.
Thus a pirate repelled by one ship is free to go and attack another ship. Thus
it is ine¢ cient to leave piracy protection in private hands.
The current reliance of the international community on Naval patrols
to combat piracy could succeed in reducing pirate activity further. But
compared to re-establishing law and order in Somalia such e¤orts are likely
to be very expensive.
5 Concluding Comments
Piracy is an important source of predation which creates economic disruption.
In this paper, we have used estimates of its e¤ect on shipping prices to
estimate the welfare cost of Somali piracy.
Somalia is now the focus of international attention although with limited
progress. In the context of potential donor interest, it is instructive to consider
how many Somalis could be hired for one year using the additional resources
that we estimate are expended by the shipping industry in response to the
threat of piracy. Using the numbers in panel B of Table 6, a conservative
estimate of the costs of piracy to the shipping industry is about $1:3 billion.
We use wage data from the Somali Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
(FSNAU) presented in Shortland (2011) to calculate a yearly wage of about
$870.53 This means that the extra spending due to piracy could nance one
year of employment for more than 1.5 million laborers at the going market
rate in 2010. This does not mean that such a transfer scheme would be
realistic or that it would prevent piracy. But it illustrates the scale of losses
to the industry relative to the reality of the Somali economy.
While what we have studied here is only one kind of lawlessness, it does
provide specic estimates of the costs of predatory activity in this particular
51See Besley and Ghatak (2010) for development of this argument in relation to property
rights enforcement.
52In addition, there is anecdotal evidence for an arms race in which pirates are better
and better equipped and ship owners move from minor ship modications to hiring security
crews. For a general discussion of these issues see de Meza and Gould (1992).
53In 2010 the highest daily wage paid in Somalia was about 100,000 Somali Shillings
(SSh). Assuming 261 work days and an exchange rate of about 30,000 SSh/$US this
implies a yearly wage of about $870:
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context. We have shown that the cost of piracy is large relative to the size of
the transfer to pirates. This is particularly true compared to a tax levied on
shipping to pay a transfer to pirates. This further underlines the di¤erence
between organized extraction by the state in the form of taxation and dis-
organized predation. We estimate that the latter is at least ten times more
costly. In the language of Olson (2000), pirates are roving bandits while the
state is a stationary bandit and hence is in a better place to organize extrac-
tion at lower costs. Without a return to strong law and order in Somalia, it
seems unlikely that these welfare costs will disappear any time soon.
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A Data
This appendix discusses the data sources and generation of variables. Table
A1 provides summary statistics for our data.
A.1 Chartering Contracts
The data on shipping prices comes from the web-site of N. Cotzias Shipping
Consultants which provides monthly reports of the time charter market for
the period November 2002 until December 2010.54 The data is comprised of
33,529 individual xtures in the dry bulk cargo segment of the market.
It contains details on the vessel that was chartered, the chartering com-
pany, the month in which the charter was xed and the approximate date
(day-range / months), when the charter would commence. The details on the
vessel give us the current ship name, the year it was built and its deadweight
tonnage. The pricing information contains the daily rate in US $, along with
a ballast bonus. From these we construct the daily rate per deadweight ton
and the ballast bonus per deadweight ton. On average, about 9% of the
charters in our sample include a ballast bonus.
The chartering information provides details about the location of the
vessel origin and the vessel destination, i.e. where it will be handed back
to the ship owner. Due to the nature of the chartering market, market
participants have an active interest in reporting the vessels delivery- and
redelivery locations. However, this information comes with varying levels of
detail. In particular the redelivery location may either be at (1) port, (2)
country, (3) maritime region or it may be missing. Further challenges include
that sometimes, the port name is spelled wrongly or abbreviations were used.
We harmonize the data to country-level pairs. The raw data contains 2,430
distinct delivery- or redelivery locations. We proceeded in two steps:
1. Try an exact match based on a database of port names.55. This will give
us, in case of an exact match, a port and the country in which this port
54In early 2011, Cotzias merged with Intermodial (www.intermodal.gr). As of 25th
January 2012, the Cotzias data was available on http://www.cotzias.gr/chart\_tc\
_rep.htm.
55This database contains the details and locations of 27,625 ports all over the
world. They include all major ports, but also smaller ports and docks. It can
be accessed on http://www.wilhelmsen.com/services/maritime/companies/buss/
directory/Operations/Ports/Pages/default.aspx.
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is located. In case no exact match was found, we used the Google Search
Engine to get a spelling suggestion (in case there was a misspelling in
the raw data) and try it again with the corrected spelling. Through
this, we are able to lter 570 locations, which account for roughly 2/3
of the observations.
2. For the remainder of the delivery- and redelivery locations, we pro-
ceed by performing Google searches in a semi-automated way, double
checking and validating the results manually.
A.2 IMB Piracy Data
The IMB runs the piracy reporting centre which can be contacted 24hours by
vessels under attack. The information received from the ship Masters is im-
mediately relayed to the local law enforcement agencies requesting assistance.
In addition, the information received from the ship Masters is broadcast to
all vessels in the Ocean region - thus highlighting the threat to a Master en
route into the area of risk. The IMB annual reports reproduce the piracy
reports received by the piracy reporting centre. They dene a piracy attack
as
An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with
the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime with the
apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of
that act. (IMB, 2009)
Under this denition, pirate attacks include all actual or attempted at-
tacks on vessels while in port, anchored, berthed or underway. While there
is some acknowledged under-reporting, it is the most complete database on
maritime piracy that is available. We obtained the annual reports of piracy
and robbery incidents from 1999-2010. Each report provides a detailed listing
of the piracy incidence, containing the following information:
 Date (usually to day)
 Name of Ship
 Flag of Ship (sometimes)
 Call sign of ship (not always)
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 IMO number of ship (not always)
 Information on location of attack, various levels of detail
 A narrative of the attack
In total, data on 5,456 incidents is reported. We were not able to use all
observations, as quite often for attacks that take place near some ports or
just o¤ some islands, the report does not include a geocoded location. We
tried to make use of as many observations as possible by manually geo-coding
the missing observations. Furthermore, in early years the data does not give
information on whether the vessel was underway- or at anchor when it was
attacked. This data was manually extracted by analyzing the narrative of
the attack given.
Using the maritime areas we described in the text, we arrive at a monthly
number of piracy attacks in that particular maritime area. This time series
is then used to forecast the numbers of attacks.
A.3 Algorithm for Maritime Routes and Distances
We rst determine start and end points for each journey. We use country
start and end points rather than specic ports. This is because there is some
ambiguity in the port information. This is more severe for some countries.
For example, the United States has access to more than one Ocean so that
errors could be quite large.
Each country information is interpreted as a specic position. We as-
signed the most frequently occurring port as our start and nish point for
each country. We are then able automate the way treatment is assigned by
computing maritime routes between these points.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. Firstly, we transform a world map
into a coarse 1 grid of the world. The coarseness of the grid allows us to
compute optimal routes for the 1,600 routes in a reasonable amount of time
on a simple Desktop computer.
The grid is thus a 360180 matrix, which we can think of as a graph.
Each cell in the matrix represents a node of the graph. We assume that
vessels can travel into any of the 8 neighboring cells. The transformation
into a grid takes into account that moving along a diagonal corresponds to
a larger distance (i.e. higher costs) than moving along straight line vertices.
We then assigned each cell a cost of crossing using the map on which the grid
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was dened. We normalize this cost of crossing to be 1 for sea- or oceans
and passing a very large number for landmass. We had to manually close the
North-West passage and, due to the coarseness of the grid, we had to open
up the Suez canal, the Malacca Straits and the Panama canal.
The start- and end-locations, given as GPS coordinates, are then mapped
into a particular cell in this graph. We can use simple shortest-path algo-
rithms to compute an optimal path from any two points on the grid. The
shortest-path implementation we used is a Dijkstra algorithm implemented
in the R package Gdistance.56
The algorithm delivers three things: a shortest path as a sequence of GPS
coordinates, its distance and a cost measure. We use the actual path for the
intention to treat assignment and the distance for some robustness checks.
A.4 Wind and Seasonality of Attacks
We obtained wind data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA), which, among others, provides detailed satellite and
observational weather data for the worlds oceans. For our purposes we
accessed the NOAA Multiple-Satellite Blended Sea Winds database. This
particular database has the advantage that it is compiled from several satel-
lites, which limits the number of coverage gaps. Another advantage is, that
it provides the data on a ne spatial grid of 0.5 and is available, without
gaps from 1987 onwards.
From this database we extracted the monthly mean wind speed pertaining
to the geographical grid of our piracy regions. For each month, we have
around 8,800 observations of the monthly mean wind speed per 0.5 cell
corresponding to our grid. We use this to compute the average wind speed
in any month for both the Somalia and Indonesia area.
Figure A1 shows the average monthly wind speed for the Somalia area
(dotted line) and the predicted wind speed (solid line). The predicted wind
speed is calculated from a regression of wind speed on month dummies
E [windt] =
12P
m=1
monthm (t) + t:
This regression has a R2 of 0:997. The strong seasonal pattern is also ap-
parent in gure A1 which clearly shows the summer monsoon seasons with
56The R package is available from http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/
gdistance.
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increased wind speeds and January and February with very calm winds.
Figure A2 shows the connection of the average wind speed prediction
(lagged) and our estimates of piracy attacks, r1W ; r2W ; :::; r12W ; from table
1. Clearly attacks and lagged wind speed are highly correlated. According to
UNOSAT (2010) to the lag reects the latency period for the pirate militias
to redeploy their vessels from the main militia bases along the Puntland
coast.
B Markov Chain Forecasts
B.1 Set up
Assume that attacks in region r at time t are given by the following switch-
ingmodel:
art = r` (1   (`rt)) + rW  (`rt) + "rt with "rt  N(0; 2r`rt) (12)
where  (S) = 0 and  (W ) = 1. Thus, rS is the mean number of attacks in
the inactive state and rW is the number of attacks when pirates are active.
This allows for the possibility that rS > 0. The transition matrix between
states is given by:
`rt 1 = W `rt 1 = S
`rt = W pr 1  qr
`rt = S 1  pr qr
and state in region r at date t, follows the process:
`rt = 1  qr + `rt 1 + vrt where r = qr + pr   1
where vrt is an error term with a state-contingent distribution of
vrt j (`rt 1 = W ) =

1  pr with probability pr
 pr with probability 1  pr
and
vrt j (`rt 1 = S) =
   (1  qr) with probability qr
qr with probability 1  qr:
Assuming a Markov Chain implies that we have a vector of six region-
specic parameters
r 

rW ; rS;
2
rW ; 
2
rS; pr; qr
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which is a complete description of the parameters governing the process of
piracy in region r. Most of our use of the model will turn around just three
parameters from this vector: rW ; pr and qr
The history of attacks is used to estimate the probability P (`rt = W j Hrt; r)
given the attack history Hrt and the parameter vector r. (details are below)
This probability can then be used to form expectations about the level of
future attacks in region r, i.e. art+1. It is easy to show that given equation
(12) the estimate of attacks in the next month is
E (art+1 : Hrt) = rW (1  qr) + rSqr (13)
+(rW   rS)rP (srt = W j Hrt; r)
where r  pr+qr 1. The rst two terms in equation (13) are time-invariant
functions of the regional parameters r. One can interpret them as the ex-
pected level of attacks in times of inactivity, i.e. at P (srt = W j Hrt; r) = 0.
The second term shows that the expected violence in the next period only de-
pends on the estimated probability of conict in t, the di¤erences in attacks
between active and inactive months and the persistence, r.
B.2 Estimation
A good starting point for the calculation of the probability of being in con-
ict, P (`rt = W j Hrt; r), is Bayesian updating in period t. In period t, the
extrapolation of last period P (`rt = W j Hrt 1; r) is updated with attacks
in t according to the standard formula:
P (`rt = W j Hrt; r) = f (art j `rt = W;Hrt 1; )P (`rt = W j Hrt 1; r)WP
j=S
f (art j `rt = j;Hrt 1; r)P (`rt = W j Hrt 1; r)
:
The immediate insight from this formula is that the probability can only be
calculated with an estimate of r because the conditional densities are given
by
f (art j `rt = j;Hrt 1; r) = 1q
22rj
exp
 
 
 
art   rj
2
22rj
!
and therefore depend on parameters in r.
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The probability P (`rt = W j Hrt; r) can be calculated if the past esti-
mate P (`rt 1 = W j Hrt 1; r) is known. To see that this dependency of
P (`rt = W j Hrt; r) on P (`rt 1 = W j Hrt 1; r) note that
P (`rt = W j Hrt; r) =
1X
j=0
P (`rt = W; `rt 1 = j j Ht 1; r) :
and
P (`rt = W; `rt 1 = j j Ht 1; r) = P (`rt = 1 j `rt 1 = j)P (`rt 1 = W j Hrt 1; r)
where P (`rt = W j `rt 1 = j) is nothing else than the estimated p and 1  
q contained in . Hence, one needs P (`rt 1 = W j Hrt 1; r) to calculate
P (`rt = W j Hrt; r).
This reliance of P (`rt = W j Hrt; r) on P (`rt 1 = W j Hrt 1; r) implies
that previous probabilities of conict have to be calculated rst. The lter
therefore takes a starting value P (`r0 = 1 j Hr0; r) and calculates
P (`r1 = 1 j Hr1; r) ; P (`r2 = 1 j Hr2; r) :::P (`rT = 1 j HrT ; r)
by iteratively updating the probability of conict with the monthly attacks
data art. To some degree this is what the charter parties of a shipment
through region r would have done, too.
However, this simple lter relies on the availability of the vector r.
The problem is that r cannot be calculated without knowing the states
`r1; `r2:::`rT which are unobserved. Hence, the estimation method needs to
determine when regime shifts occurred and at the same time estimate the
parameters of the model. One way of estimating the parameters of the vio-
lence process is the Expectation Maximization (EM) Algorithm described in
Hamilton (1990) which generates an estimate of r by iteration.
In each iteration the algorithm makes use of the "smoothed" probability
of conict which is based on the entire violence data for a region
P (`rt = 1 j arT ; arT 1; :::; ar1; r) :
C Cost Factors
C.1 Damage to Vessels
Direct damage is typically due to attempts attempting to board a vessel.
This could be damage due to small arms re or rocket propelled grenades.
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Damages to the cargo are typically small, at least in bulk shipping which we
focus on, while damage to the hull is more common.57 As a consequence, the
risk to hulls has now been unbundled from the Hull and Machinery (H&M)
insurance and put into special War Risk Insurance. The latter now depends
on the area of sea that a ship crosses. In May 2008 the Joint War Committee
in London declared the Gulf of Aden as an area of high risk. This high
risk area has since then expanded considerably and now covers the whole
area called "Somalia" in gure 2.58 Cargo insurances do not typically charge
additional premiums for specic sea areas.59 Since hull damage is covered
by insurance we expect such costs to be passed on to ship charterers.
C.2 Loss of Hire and Delay
The distribution of costs coming from loss of hire depends on the individual
chartering agreements. These determine to what extent a charterer has to
pay the daily chartering rate for the time that a ship is being held by pirates.
According to an industry norm the charterer is responsible for the rst 90
days following seizure.60 With an estimated rolling average of 205 days under
seizure at the end of 2010 this implies a relatively even share of costs.61 The
risk of not being operational after release (due to damage to ship during
captivity) is with the ship owner. This risk is substantial as immobility of
several months without maintenance is bound to incapacitate a ship.
C.3 Ransom Payments
Ransom payments typically reach several million dollars and are, in principle,
shared between the owner of the vessel, a chartering party and the owner of
the cargo or special insurances that these parties purchased.62 However, this
57Hastings (2009) stresses that cargo is not stolen during captivity in the case of Somalia
because the infrastructure for transporting it o¤ is lacking.
58For details see http://www.lmalloyds.com/Web/market\_places/marine/JWC/
Joint\_War.aspx.
59See Marshs Global Marine Practice available at http://usa.marsh.com/LinkClick.
aspx?fileticket=jLOZA8S3gds\%3D\&tabid=1985\&mid=10432.
60This norm is the "BIMCO Piracy Clause 2009". BIMCO is the largest international
shipping associations representing ship-owners.
61For a summary see MARSH (2011).
62See http://www.intertanko.com/upload/2011Athens/athensmay11\
_chartering\_piracy.pdf.
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applies only on journeys with cargo on board. In addition, the crew falls into
the ship owners obligations if brought o¤ the ship.63 Both the ship owners
H&M insurance and the war risk insurance will cover part of this ransom.
Kidnap and Ransom (K&R) insurance policies, introduced in 2008, provide
additional cover for the payment of ransoms. It is unclear what proportion
of ships are insured by these policies.64 However, the fact that these are
designed for shipowners is indicative that these bear the main burden of
ransom payments. Even if ransoms are not paid ship owners need to pay a
signicant wage risk bonus to crew when travelling through pirate territory.
C.4 Security
The maritime industrys Best Practices manual lists a long list of changes
to ship and crew stretching from barbed wire, high pressure re hoses and
citadels to additional security teams, that can help prevent a successful pirate
attack/hijack.65 All these expenses will be borne by the ship owner. The
notion of an "arms race" between better equipped pirates and ever more
sophisticated defence mechanisms by ship owners suggests that there might
be costs on the side of ship owners that exceed the expected sum of ransom
payments. According to The Economist 40 % of ships carried security crews
by 2012.66 We expect these costs to be passed on to charterers.
C.5 Re-routing
The cost of re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope, especially among very
large vessels, has been highlighted as a major element of the costs of piracy
in early publications on the issue.67 In the public debate this notion was
often supported by a drastic decrease in Suez canal tra¢ c in 2008. However,
Suez canal tra¢ c data can be misleading in this regard as world bulk trade
collapsed only a few months before the increase in pirate activity. In addition,
63For a discussion see MARSH (2011) and http://usa.marsh.com/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=jLOZA8S3gds\%3D\&tabid=1985\&mid=10432, accessed on 10.04.2012.
64Though some industry experts claim that as of 2009, the proportion of ships covered
by such policies was less than 10 %, see http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,
8599,1892366,00.html.
65These are updated regularly. The version referred to here is BMP4 (2011) "Best
Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy".
66Laws and guns, The Economist, April 14th 2012.
67See, for example, One Earth Future (2010) and Bendall (2011).
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it should be kept in mind that large Capesize Bulk Carriers were never able
to cross the Suez canal and would go around the Cape regardless of pirate
activity. Indeed, more recent evidence using satellite imaging suggests that
re-routing around the Cape is likely to be a minor issue.68 Rerouting costs are
in principle fully recoverable from the charterer since contracts are written
for daily ship hire and any increase in fuel costs can be passed on.
The bottom line from this discussion is that looking at contract prices in
shipping should pick up a good deal of the increased costs imposed by piracy.
However, we would expect this to be a lower bound on the overall cost to the
shipping industry since some of the direct costs paid by charterers may not
be captured. This issue taken into account in our welfare calculations.
D Calculating the Quantity Reaction
The general formula for the welfare loss can be written
V ( +  [c+ t])  V ( +  [c+]) = Q (t)
' Q () +Q0 () [t ] + 1
2
Q00 () [t ]2 :
Note that
V ( +  [c+ t]) = U

X^ ( +  [c+ t])

  X^ ( +  [c+ t]) [ +  [c+ t]] :
When we derive the partial derivative using
@U

X^ ( +  [c+ t])

@X^ ( +  [c+ t])
=  +  [c+ t]
we nd that
Q0 (t) =  vX^ ( +  [c+ t]) :
Now observe that:
Q () = 0
Q0 () =  X^ ( +  [c+])
Q00 () =  2X^ 0 ( +  [c+])
68See One Earth Future (2011).
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We assume that the demand function has a constant price elasticity  so that
we can write
X^ ( +  [c+ t]) = ( +  [c+ t])  :
and inserting all this we get an approximation of the welfare loss
Q () +Q0 () [t ] + 1
2
Q00 () [t ]2
= X^ ( +  [c+]) [  t]  1
2
2X^ 0 ( +  [c+]) [t ]2
= X^ ( +  [c+]) [  t]

1 +
1
2

 (  t)
 +  [c+ t]

= X^ ( +  [c+]) [  t]

1 +
1
2
^
  t
c+

 X^ ( +  [c+]) [   ()]

1 +
1
2
   ()
c+
^

:
Where we replaced the trade elasticity with regard to price  (which we do
not have) with the trade elasticity with regard to transport costs, ^ (available
from the trade literature). Observe that the trade elasticity with respect to
transport costs, ^, in terms of our model is
^ =
@ logX
@ log 
= 

 + 
so that, using the denition of  above, we get
 = ^
 +  [c+]
 [c+]
:
The last inequality uses the fact that  ()  t. So this gives a lower bound
on the welfare loss and depends on observables. Comparing this to equation
(9) we can rewrite the welfare loss
L2 () ' L1 ()

1 +
1
2
   ()
c+
^

:
E Calculations of Welfare Costs
The rst column in table 6 reports:
L1 () = [   ()] X^ ( +  [c+])
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in this appendix we rst present the calculations for column (1) in Panel (A)
and (B). We then discuss the calculations of column (2) and (3). Military
costs in Panel (C) are discussed last.
Total Cargo shipped through the Suez Canal is around 646; 064; 000 tons
per year.69 According to data from Stopford (2009) bulk ships travel at
around 26km per hour (14 knots) and the average distance that charters
travel which pass through the Gulf of Aden is 16; 400 km with a typical
charter length of 26.3 days. To this we add 4 days on charter for loading
and unloading. This does not include waiting time in Suez and neglects the
possibility of re-routing.
Our estimates in Panel B in Table 6 add the costs imposed by piracy on
maritime tra¢ c through the broader Somali area to this cost. In order to
calculate this we use the estimates in column (2) of Table 5. In order to
give a number to the tonnage travelling through this area (but not the Gulf
of Aden) we use UNCTAD data on maritime transport between the Middle
East and Africa/Asia. The data suggests that about 445; 000; 000 tons were
shipped through the area in 2010. Most of this are oil exports from the
Middle East. As before we use our data to calculate the average charter
length (20:67 days) and the average charter rate (0.4646 USD/DWT days).
Low estimate:
Gulf of Aden
0:00712  13:9  0:4726  30:3  646064000 = $915:6 million
 $120 million
= $795:6 million
Somalia
0:00807  13:9  0:4726  30:3  646064000 = $1; 037:8 million
0:00334  13:9  0:4648  20:67  445000000 = $198:5 million
 $120 million
= $1; 116:3 million.
Our medium estimate for the welfare loss is calculated exactly as the
lower bound except that we use monthly data of the tra¢ c through the Gulf
of Aden available from the Suez Canal authority and the monthly piracy
69See http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=7.
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projections from Table 1. Details of these calculations (for Somalia) are in
appendix Table A3.
Medium estimate:
Gulf of Aden
$995:4 million
 $120 million
= $875:4 million
Somalia (see calculations in appendix table A4):
$1; 112:8 million
+$183:8 million
 $120 million
= $1; 176:6 million.
Our high estimate uses the estimate on the law of order state in column (1)
of Table 4 to derive the costs of piracy. That estimate suggests that piracy
leads to an increase of charter rates by 14:6 percent.
High estimate:
Gulf of Aden
0:146  0:4726  30:3  646064000 = $1; 350:7 million
 $120 million
= $1; 230:7 million
Somalia: we use estimates from a regression which we have not reported. It
gives estimates of 0:163 for the Gulf of Aden and 0:08 for non-Gulf of Aden
trade lanes. Thus:
0:163  0:4726  30:3  646064000 = $1; 508 million
0:08  0:4648  20:67  445000000 = $342 million
 $120 million
= $1; 730 million.
Column (2) in Table 6 applies the additional factor derived in equation (10).
We estimate of the relative increase in transport costs due to piracy as

c+
= 0:00712  13:9 = 0:1
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and get an estimate of
1   ()

= 1  $120 million
$915:6 million + $198:5 million
= 0:903:
There are several possible numbers we could use for ^. Latest results from
Feyrer (2009) who uses the Suez Canal closure as a shock to distance and
calculates the e¤ects on trade from distance costs suggests that an estimate
between 0.2 and 0.5 for ^ is realistic. The estimate found in a meta study
in Disdier (2008) is 0.9. Given the similarity of the Feyrer study we use the
estimate of 0.5 in column 2. This leads to an adjustment of
L2 () = L1 ()

1 +
1
2

1   ()



c+
^

= L1 () 1:0226
which is applied to the whole welfare loss caused by price increases. The low
estimate for Aden is, for example,
($915:6 million  $120 million) 1:0226 = $813:6 million.
In order to calculate the values in column (3) of Table 6 we need an
estimate of  (equation (11)). We use commodity price data ship price data
and match the latter with ship characteristics in our sample. In addition, we
calculate the share of transits in ballast through the Suez canal to adjust our
estimate of the general average accordingly. The details for these calculations
are in the appendix F. We nd a median value for the share borne by the
shipowner of around 0:7346.70 so that if the general average was applied
our estimates would underestimate the true cost by a factor of up to 2:13.
Combined with our high estimate this would imply an increase in chartering
cost by 30 percent. However, for reasons laid out in section 3.1 this is likely
to be an upper bound. The low estimate for Aden, for example, can then be
calculated as
$915:6 million  2:13
 $120 million
= $1; 830:2 billion
70Of course, for other kinds of cargo such as oil, this could be a signicantly lower factor.
This highlights the fact that backing out the costs of piracy from changes in the charter
rate is particularly realistic in the bulk shipping sector in which most goods are relatively
cheap.
47
Panel C in Table 6 adds the costs of naval operations which try to limit
pirate activities. The costs of Atalanta for the European Union in 2009 was
$ 11 million71 To this we need to add the costs of the EU member countries.
The only available estimates indicate that additional operational costs for the
German military involvement (1 vessel, 300 personal) in 2010 was around $
60 million.72 Since the overall size of the Atalanta mission is between 4 and
7 vessels this indicates total costs of about $ 340 million for the Atalanta
mission. In addition to Atalanta there are two more operations which are,
at least partially, occupied with preventing piracy attacks: NATOs Ocean
Shield and the Combined Force 151. Causality from piracy to the presence of
some of the military forces in the Arabian sea is harder to establish.73 Panel
(C) simply adds military costs of $340, $680 and $1; 020 million to the low,
medium and high estimates respectively. .
F General Average Computation
The general average insurance rules imply that the cost of piracy is borne by
both cargo owners as well as by the ship owners. It is the ship owners, who
in turn pass on this cost to the chartering parties in form of higher chartering
rates. This is what we estimate in our main specication. However due to
the general average principle, this e¤ect is underestimated, since the ship
owners insurer pays only a share of the piracy cost in cases in which the ship
is laden. In this appendix we describe at how we arrive at the scaling factor
 > 1 used in the welfare calculations paper.
The rst step is to estimate the market value of the vessels in our dataset.
Second, we estimate the values of the cargo that these ships transport. The
ratio of the values is indicative for general average rules. In a third step, we
estimate the share of ballast journeys, in order to correct for the fact that,
during these journeys, the ship owner bears the entire cost of piracy.
From weekly market reports of the ship brokerage rm Intermodial74, we
obtained recorded sales of dry bulk vessels on the second hand market for
71See http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/, accessed on 10.04.2012.
72Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/179. Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewa¤neter
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten Operation Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der Pi-
raterie vor der Küste Somalias.
73For example, the Combined Froce 151 includes two US aircraft carriers stationed there.
74These reports can be accessed on http://www.intermodal.gr/site/market/
market.php
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2010. In total, there were 402 recorded transaction. For a subset of 379
of these transactions, we know the age of the ship, the vessels deadweight
tonnage and the value of the transaction.
Using these data on transactions, we can estimate the value of the ships
2010 in our dataset for the year. These estimates use two common controls
in both data-sets: the age of ship and its tonnage to carry out this matching.
Clearly, there are many more controls that correlate with the price that a
vessel achieves on the market. However, we abstract from these due to data
limitations. Either way, our estimated values are likely constitute a lower
bound on a ships value due to the standard adverse selection problem.
Using the 379 recorded sales, we estimate a regression of the form:
Ship_Pricel = 0 + 1Agel + 2DWTl + l
Using the estimated coe¢ cients, we generate tted values for our main sample
for the ships in 2010. The estimated values for vessels travelling through the
Suez Canal in our sample are as follows:
Quartile Value ($)
Lower Quartile 26,791,260
Median 32,637,280
Upper Quartile 37,281,280
This compares well with industry-wide gures published by ship brokerage
rms. For 2010, Intermodal for example reports that a ve year old Pana-
max vessel with 75,000 tons deadweight was estimated to be worth $ 39
Million. In our dataset, the median ship on the Aden route is 7 years old, i.e.
slightly older and with 73,726 tons deadweight slightly smaller. This makes
us condent that the tted ship values are indeed quite realistic for 2010.
We estimate the value of the cargo carried by the dry bulk ships in our
sample using Suez Canal Tra¢ c statistics. These provide a very crude dis-
aggregation into the di¤erent types and quantities of goods carried through
the Suez canal. We try to link this disaggregation with average commodity
price data for the year 2010 obtained from the IMF and the World Bank.
Any matching to these average commodity values is quite crude since the
Suez authorities, for example, do not decompose such broad categories as
cereals, ores and metals, coal and coke or oil seeds.75 With this caveat, we
75These four commodities make up at least 48.3 % of all commodities in the Suez tra¢ c
that can broadly be classied as (dry) bulk cargo.
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match to our data using four main commodity prices: coal, iron ore, soybean
and wheat. Using the tra¢ c statistics on these four broad commodities, we
compute the value of the average ton of these commodities passing through
the Suez canal.
Using this, we estimate the value of the average ton of dry bulk carried
through Suez Canal. Using the median ship in our dataset, this allows us
to estimate the value of cargo. We compute lower- and upper-bound values
for these estimates using plain commodity prices for coal and wheat. This
yields the following range of estimates:
Cargo type Price ($) per Ton Cargo Value ($)
(Low value) Coal cargo 106.03 7,451,675.41
Average Suez dry bulk cargo 165.97 11,663,908.20
(High value) Wheat 223.67 15,719,087.90
Using the previously estimates, we can compute the ratio of the cargo to
ship value. However, using this share as a scaling factor , we are likely to
underestimate the general average share paid by the ship owner. This is due
to a signicant proportion of voyages being ballast journeys (i.e. without
cargo). Using Suez canal tra¢ c data, we nd that in 2010, 25:7% of the dry
bulk carrier transits were ballast journeys. Hence, the general average share
of the ship owner should be:
 = (1  b)  (1  cargo/ship) + b
where b is the share of the ballast journey.
Using this, we arrive at the following general average shares for our me-
dian ship value:
Cargo type Cargo-to-ship value 
Average Suez dry bulk cargo 0.35738 0.7346
The value of  from this table is used in the Table 6 to estimate the welfare
loss.
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Table 1: EM estimates of Markov chain parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Markov chain 
estimates for Somalia
number of attacks per 
month with weak law 
and order
number of attacks per 
month with strong law 
and order
persistence factor 
(lambda)
change in forecast attacks 
from strong to weak state:  
((1) - (2)) x (3)
no monthly means 15.25 2.09 0.87 11.45
monthly means January 11.88 2.24 0.98 9.43
February 7.14 2.40 0.98 4.64
March 29.99 2.82 0.98 26.58
April 31.83 4.36 0.98 26.87
May 23.18 3.79 0.98 18.96
June 12.57 1.96 0.98 10.37
July 4.09 3.26 0.98 0.81
August 9.35 1.81 0.98 7.38
September 15.16 1.15 0.98 13.71
October 18.39 3.11 0.98 14.94
November 26.13 1.97 0.98 23.63
December 11.93 1.97 0.98 9.75
average 16.80 2.57 13.92
SD 9.09 0.92 8.53
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Markov chain 
estimates for Indonesia
number of attacks per 
month with weak law 
and order
number of attacks per 
month with strong law 
and order
persistence factor 
(lambda)
change in forecast attacks 
from strong to weak state: 
((1) - (2)) x (3) 
no monthly means 8.86 3.95 0.92 4.52
monthly means January 3.68 3.05 0.92 0.58
February 5.03 2.65 0.92 2.20
March 9.69 3.82 0.92 5.40
April 15.14 5.85 0.92 8.55
May 9.48 4.41 0.92 4.66
June 11.10 5.17 0.92 5.45
July 7.59 3.46 0.92 3.80
August 9.99 3.82 0.92 5.68
September 5.58 3.64 0.92 1.78
October 9.78 4.51 0.92 4.86
November 9.50 3.94 0.92 5.11
December 5.83 3.96 0.92 1.72
average 8.53 4.02 4.15
SD 3.16 0.88 2.23
Notes: The parameters under "no monthly means" are estimated with the EM Algorithm under the assumption that there is a single mean level of attacks in the
weak and strong state of law and order. The numbers under "monthly means" are estimated under the assumption of a seasonal pattern in piracy attacks
which leads to a month-specific mean under weak and strong law and order. The persistence factor is explained in the appendix. The time series of attacks
from January 2002 till December 2010 were used to estimate the parameters. 
Table 2: Suez canal traffic and pirate attacks
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Suez canal traffic Suez canal traffic
piracy attacks -145.5 26.51
(96.03) (104.4)
post Lehmann Brothers 
bankruptcy -6,712***
(2,180)
R-squared 0.048 0.213
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Suez
canal traffic" is the montly number of tons shipped through the canal. "Piracy
attacks" is the number of piracy attacks in the same month. "Post Lehmann
Brothers bankruptcy" is a dummy that takes the value of 1 after September
2008.
Table 3: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
forecast number of attacks 
(Somalia) 0.0103*** 0.00712*** 0.00726*** 0.00300**
(0.00273) (0.00177) (0.00182) (0.00141)
forecast number of attacks 
(Indonesia) 0.00437 0.00177 0.00197 0.0139*** 0.00208
(0.00285) (0.00152) (0.00146) (0.00525) (0.00161)
forecast attacks * handysize 
(Somalia) -0.000235
(0.00298)
forecast attacks * handymax 
(Somalia) 0.00800***
(0.00274)
forecast attacks * panamax 
(Somalia) 0.00828***
(0.00183)
forecast attacks * small 
capesize (Somalia) 0.00798***
(0.00249)
forecast attacks * capesize 
(Somalia) -0.000883
(0.00313)
ballast bonus per dwt -9.408*
(5.264)
ship age -0.00613***
(0.000789)
handysize 0.625*** 0.624*** 0.638*** 0.609*** 0.621***
(0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0203) (0.0370) (0.0255)
handymax 0.401*** 0.401*** 0.403*** 0.354*** 0.393***
(0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0205) (0.0312) (0.0257)
panamax 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.153***
(0.0141) (0.0140) (0.00890) (0.0219) (0.0152)
capesize -0.0380 -0.0380 -0.0508* -0.0898 -0.0252
(0.0396) (0.0390) (0.0298) (0.0870) (0.0478)
dyad fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
month fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 24363 24363 24332 10058 24363
R-squared 0.873 0.873 0.877 0.862 0.874
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Dwt" is deadweight tonnage. "Daily charter rate per dwt" is
the log of the time charter rate per day per deadweight tonnage. All attack variables are interactions between a dummy that indicates
whether a ship will cross a pirate territory and the number of attacks in that territory. The "forecast number of attacks" is calculated as in
equation (2) in column (1) and as in equation (4) in columns (2) to (5). "Handysize" is a dummy that indicates ships with dwt< 35000.
"Handymax" are ships with 35000<dwt<55000. "Panamax" are ships with 55000<dwt<80000. "Small capesize" are ships with
80000<dwt<150000 (omitted). "Capesize" are ships with dwt>150000. "Ballast bonus" is a payment that compensates the ship owner for
travelling without cargo on return. Column (4) only uses data after the surge in piracy in the Somalia region May 2008. Column (5) controls
for interactions between ship categories and the respective region dummy.
Table 4: Robustness to Alternative Measures of Pirate Attacks and Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
weak law and order state 
(Somalia) 0.146*** 0.305***
(0.0341) (0.0818)
weak law and order state 
(Indonesia) 0.0153 -0.0721
(0.0124) (0.111)
weak law and order * 
windspeed (Somalia) -0.0253***
(0.00960)
windspeed (Somalia) 0.00533
(0.00389)
weak law and order * 
windspeed (Indonesia) 0.0153
(0.0198)
windspeed (Indonesia) -0.0200
(0.0141)
forecast number of attacks 
(Somalia) 0.00786*** 0.00869*** 0.00494***
(0.00175) (0.00281) (0.00132)
forecast number of attacks 
(Indonesia) 0.000595 0.00454* -0.000704
(0.00296) (0.00264) (0.00247)
number of attacks (Somalia) 0.00572***
(0.00128)
number of attacks (Indonesia) 0.000178
(0.00120)
annual GDP growth start region -0.360***
(0.0733)
annual GDP growth destination 
region 0.127*
(0.0660)
ship size controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
dyad fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
month fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
dely country time trends no no no no no yes
Observations 24363 24363 24363 24363 24,332 24363
R-squared 0.874 0.874 0.873 0.873 0.878 0.878
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Dwt" is deadweight tonnage. "Daily charter rate (per dwt)" is the log of
the time charter rate per day (per deadweight tonnage). All piracy variables are interactions between a dummy that indicates whether a ship will
cross a pirate territory and the number of (expected) attacks in that territory. "Weak law and order state" measures the probability that an area
features weak law and order in that month. "Windspeed" is the (predicted) seasonal windspeed in the piracy area in the same month. "Forecast
number of attacks" is the forecasted number of attacks next month calculated using an AR(2) model for column (3) and equation (4) for columns (5)
and (6)
Table 5: Robustness to Alternative Treatment Definitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
daily charter 
rate per dwt
forecast number of attacks           
(Gulf of Aden) 0.00998**
(0.00472)
forecast number of attacks  
(Malacca) -0.00839
(0.00882)
Somalia forecast number of 
attacks  (Gulf of Aden) 0.00807***
(0.00205)
Somalia forecast number of 
attacks  (not Gulf of Aden) 0.00334***
(0.00128)
Indonesia forecast number of 
attacks (Strait of Malacca) 0.00133
(0.00150)
Indonesia forecast number of 
attacks (not Strait of Malacca) 0.00272
(0.00292)
forecast number of attacks 
(Somalia) 0.00580*** 0.00692***
(0.00170) (0.00169)
forecast number of attacks 
(Indonesia) 0.00203 0.00333**
(0.00154) (0.00159)
ship size controls yes yes yes yes
dyad fixed effect yes yes yes yes
month fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Observations 24,084 24,363 24,363 24,363
R-squared 0.874 0.873 0.873 0.873
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Dwt" is deadweight tonnage. "Daily charter rate
(per dwt)" is the log of the time charter rate per day (per deadweight tonnage). All piracy variables are interactions between a
dummy that indicates whether a ship will cross a pirate territory and the number of expected attacks from application of the EM
algorithm for that territory. Column (1) takes a smaller treatment area and uses piracy estimates from attacks in this area.
Column(2) uses the piracy estimates from our main specification and applies them to different treatment areas. Columns (3)
and (4) have an alternative treatment assignment. Alternative routes not using the Suez canal were used if the alternative route
was at most 10% and 20% longer than the Suez route, respectively.
Table 6: The Welfare Cost of Piracy in 2010
Panel A: Gulf of Aden (1) (2) (3)
L1 (in million USD) L2 (in million USD) L3 (in million USD)
low estimate 795.6 813.6 1830.2
medium estimate 875.4 895.2 2000.2
high estimate 1230.7 1258.5 2757.0
Panel B: Somalia (1) (2) (3)
L1 (in million USD) L2 (in million USD) L3 (in million USD)
low estimate 1116.3 1141.5 2513.3
medium estimate 1176.6 1203.1 2641.8
high estimate 1730.0 1769.1 3820.5
Panal C: Somalia Including 
Costs of Military Intervention (1) (2) (3)
L1 (in million USD) L2 (in million USD) L3 (in million USD)
low estimate 1456.3 1481.5 2853.3
medium estimate 1856.6 1883.1 3321.8
high estimate 2750.0 2789.1 4840.5
Calulcalations are discussed in section 4 and the apprendix E. Column (2) adjusts the welfare loss by taking into
account the change in trade. Column (3) adjusts the cost to take into account the share of costs borne by charterers.
Panel B uses data on trade from the Middle East to calculate the costs for the area including the Indian Ocean. Panel
C adds cost estimates of the military intervention of 340, 680 and 1,020 for the low, medium and high estimate
respectively.
Table A1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
deadweight tonnage (dwt) 80092.19 39495.48 5169 300000
rate per day per dwt (in US$) 0.45 0.30 0.01 4.04
number of attacks in Somalia 7.03 9.06 0 42
number of attacks in Indonesia 6.08 3.93 1 23
ballast bonus per dwt (in US$) 1.03 70.26 0 1.10E+04
distance (in km) 8014 6846 0 2.41E+04
shipage (in years) 9.45 7.31 0 39
average predicted wind speed in 
m/s (Somalia) 6.34 1.38 4.36 8.81
average predicted wind speed in 
m/s (Indonesia) 5.80 0.57 4.69 6.58
forecast number of attacks Somalia 
(Markov Chain) 7.73 5.22 2.79 14.20
forecast number of attacks 
Indonesia (Markov Chain) 5.74 1.94 4.13 8.62
forecast number of attacks Somalia 
(AR(2)) 14.59 13.75 1.98 57.26
forecast number of attacks 
Indonesia (AR(2)) 7.20 2.36 3.64 17.18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
attacks in 
Somalia
attacks in 
Somalia
attacks in 
Somalia
attacks in 
Indonesia
attacks in 
Indonesia
attacks in 
Indonesia
AR(2) prediction 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.0999) (0.191)
lagged probability of 
weak state 13.44*** 4.775***
(1.591) (0.773)
prediction using seasonal 
Markov chain 1.081*** 1.132***
(0.0540) (0.110)
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98
R-squared 0.511 0.426 0.807 0.222 0.285 0.522
Table A2: Prediction of pirate attacks through different models
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A3: Calculating the cost of piracy with monthly weights
Gulf of Aden
2010
Suez canal traffic 
(1000 tons)
change in forecast 
attacks from weak 
to strong state
coefficient * 
voyage time
rate per dwt per 
day
monthly piracy 
cost
1 66440 9.43 0.244521 0.4292725 65764352.33
2 58736 4.64 0.244521 0.3824704 25488034.19
3 67528 26.58 0.244521 0.4723519 207310211
4 65744 26.87 0.244521 0.4532415 195780584.9
5 71089 18.97 0.244521 0.4991807 164605250.8
6 70233 10.38 0.244521 0.3851997 68665830.42
7 71868 0.81 0.244521 0.2889743 4113352.812
8 78314 7.38 0.244521 0.335882 47467751.74
9 72810 13.71 0.244521 0.3581775 87426471.33
10 74601 14.94 0.244521 0.3184269 86780302.29
11 72464 23.63 0.244521 0.2934963 122886682.2
12 76563 9.75 0.244521 0.2844657 51924177.89
TOTAL 1,128,213,002
Not-Gulf of Aden
2010 traffic (1000 tons)
change in forecast 
attacks from weak 
to strong state
coefficient * 
voyage time
rate per dwt per 
day
monthly piracy 
cost
1 37083 9.43 0.0690378 0.5173657 12490249.97
2 37083 4.64 0.0690378 0.4017614 4772522.603
3 37083 26.58 0.0690378 0.6091805 41453649.8
4 37083 26.87 0.0690378 0.4869402 33496937.34
5 37083 18.97 0.0690378 0.4428866 21509072.13
6 37083 10.38 0.0690378 0.4039374 10734287.52
7 37083 0.81 0.0690378 0.3062704 635114.2385
8 37083 7.38 0.0690378 0.3215037 6074410.558
9 37083 13.71 0.0690378 0.3774568 13248493.99
10 37083 14.94 0.0690378 0.3100852 11860238.99
11 37083 23.63 0.0690378 0.3333106 20163905.42
12 37083 9.75 0.0690378 0.2962804 7395530.672
TOTAL 183,834,413
Figure 1: Attacks and Treatment Areas 
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Figure 2: Time Series of Attacks in Somalia (left) and Indonesia (right) 
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Figure 3: Expected attacks - Markov Chain Without Seasons 
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Figure 4: Prediction of Pirate Attacks 
Figure 5: Calculated Shipping Lanes 
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Figure A1: Wind Speed in the Somalia Area 
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Figure A2: Wind Speed and Attacks in the Somalia Area 
